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oriented innovation in various countries’ agendas regarding smart (innovation-led) growth, 
and not just fixers of ‘market failures’. The market failure justification for public finance fails 
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new markets, these banks are developing new financial tools that also help to reform the 
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work on mission-oriented policies (that is, policies that aim to address societal issues or 
challenges). The paper presents a rich analytical description of mission-oriented investments 
in two of the leading SIBs: Brazil’s BNDES and Germany’s KfW. We discuss the 
directionality of the investments, the various tools used, and the lessons to be learned for 
evaluating these tools outside of a market failure framework. 
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Many countries and regions currently have policy objectives of promoting smart (that 
is, innovation-led) growth agendas that are framed around ‘grand challenges’, such as those 
related to climate change and the ageing crisis (European Commission, 2011). Accordingly, 
the need for long-term investments in the real economy to achieve these goals and address 
societal challenges is enormous. The real question, however, is where the finance will come 
from to fund such long-term strategies. This question is especially relevant in an era in which 
the financial sector has become increasingly short-termist (Haldane, 2011; Kay, 2012) and 
private companies have become increasingly financialised, focused on quarterly stock 
market performance (Dore, 2008). 
 
The case of green energy technologies, which are crucial for tackling climate change, 
energy security, air pollution, and resource depletion, is paradigmatic. Out of the massive 
amount of funds managed by institutional investors – US$83 trillion as of 2012 – only US$13 
billion (0.016 per cent of the total) was committed to renewable energy projects in the eight 
years between 2004 and 2012 (Kaminker et al., 2013). And at the same time, the large 
energy companies are the biggest repurchasers of their own stock, preferring to boost stock 
prices than to invest in renewable energy innovation (Lazonick, 2013). Therefore, it is clear 
that the issue is not one of a lack of finance (or ‘credit crunch’), but what type of finance it is 
and where it goes. Innovation requires patient, long-term finance, not just any type of finance 
(Mazzucato, 2013b).  
 
The present paper deals with the new roles that state investment banks (SIBs)1 play 
in financing smart (that is, innovation-led) growth, due to private finance retreating from 
funding the real economy (Haldane, 2011). The paper shows that as private finance has 
retreated, the need for SIBs to fill the gap has increased. A select number of such public 
banks are providing counter-cyclical investments and also directing those investments in 
specific directions, related to technological missions and grand societal challenges. The key 
contribution of the present paper is to introduce the mission-oriented framework to the 
analysis of such an active role of SIBs in financing grand challenges. We argue that while 
the traditional ‘market failure’ framework can explain some of the investments, it is harder for 
this framework to explain the extensive and deep investments that such banks are providing 
in high-risk areas along the entire innovation chain. We argue that a ‘mission-oriented’ 
approach (Foray et al. 2012) is particularly useful for documenting such investments and for 
evaluating them. On the normative side, we argue that, in light of the policy priorities of 
achieving smart growth and of reforming the financial system so that long-term investments 
receive priority over short-term speculative ones, SIBs represent an institutional model to 
help reform the financial system from within and to achieve smart innovation-led growth. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the contemporary 
context in which the financial system is increasingly inwardly focused, concentrated on 
achieving speculative short-term profits to the detriment of risky and uncertain financing of 
long-term projects, and, concomitantly, the real economy itself became speculative and 
financialised. This trend is contrasted with the policy agenda of achieving smart, inclusive 
and sustainable growth through policies that also seek to address societal challenges. 
Section 3 presents the roles of SIBs in the economy, from counter-cyclical and capital 
development to venture capitalist and mission-oriented. The paper focuses on the third and 
fourth roles; therefore, section 4 reviews the mission-oriented literature in detail to show that 
it overlooked the role of SIBs in financing mission-oriented projects. Section 5 presents the 
methodology as it is applied to the empirical section 6, which documents the rise of SIBs as 
venture capitalists and mission-oriented investors. This section focuses on two of the world’s 
leading SIBs: one from a developing country (the national development bank of Brazil, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Throughout this paper, the terms state investment bank and development bank are used interchangeably. 
BNDES) and the other from an industrialised country (Germany’s KfW). Our rich empirical 
analysis highlights a contemporary trend whereby countries, via SIBs, move toward placing 
public finance at the centre of the investment and innovation process in order to address 
contemporary challenges and fulfil their smart, sustainable and inclusive growth agendas. 
Section 7 reflects on our empirical findings and concludes that, given the characteristics of 
the new missions (or societal challenges), SIBs seem better positioned than centralised 
funding agencies to finance related projects, including innovation. The paper finishes with a 
proposal for areas for future research on mission-oriented SIBs. 
 
2. Financialisation: Who will fund the capital development of the economy? 
 
The works of many prominent economists, including Thorstein Veblen, John Maynard 
Keynes and Hyman Minsky, have long pointed to the fact that the character of specific 
financial structures is not inconsequential to the workings of the real economy and 
productive enterprises. For instance, Veblen (1904) distinguished between industrial and 
pecuniary motives and emphasised how the pursuit of pecuniary gains by business 
managers and investment bankers is often in stark opposition to technological (industrial) 
advances (Wray, 2012). Keynes also highlighted how ‘speculative’ finance is a threat to the 
workings of industrial enterprises: 
 
Speculators do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the 
position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of 
speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes the by-
product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill done. The 
measure of success attained by Wall Street, regarded as an institution of 
which the proper social purpose is to direct new investment into the most 
profitable channels in terms of future yield, cannot be claimed as one of the 
outstanding triumphs of laissez-faire capitalism – which is not surprising, if I 
am right in thinking that the best brains of Wall Street have been in fact 
directed towards a different object. (Keynes, 2006 [1936], p. 142–143)  
 
As Minsky (1992) put it, this ‘dichotomy between enterprise and speculation draws attention 
to the financial structure as an essential element in the capital development process. In a 
successful capitalist economy the financial structure abets enterprise. When finance fosters 
speculation the performance of a capitalist economy falters’ (p. 11). The key point is that 
capital development investments such as innovation and infrastructure require finance, but 
the type of finance received affects the types of investments made (O’Sullivan, 2004; 
Mazzucato, 2013b). Indeed, the type of financial structures in an economy (for example, the 
quantity and type of banks) is not inconsequential to the workings of the real economy and 
productive enterprises. Some financial structures are conducive to what Minsky calls the 
‘capital development’ of the economy, which includes privately owned capital equipment, 
technologies, skills, and public infrastructure (Minsky, 1992). Yet, capital development is 
hampered when speculative finance targets low-risk, short-term gains through the trade of 
securities and other investments types that ‘[amount] to little more than pyramid schemes 
[i.e., Minsky’s “Ponzi finance”]’ (Wray, 2012, p. 310). This is the issue of ‘inept’ (wrong) 
investments, which contributes to a second type of issue – insufficiency of investments 
(Minsky, 1992) – whereby funds are diverted from financing innovation, creating a 
funding/financing gap. Together, these issues lead to underinvestment in capital 
development and may ultimately lead to financial and economic crises. The global financial 
crisis of 2007 is a case in point. Minsky referred to the laissez-faire financial architecture that 
was established in the 1980s as ‘money manager capitalism’, which he believed was 
inhibiting the ‘capital development of the economy’ because it led to speculation, short-
termism, volatility, uncertainty and financial instability (Minsky and Whalen, 1996; 
Papadimitriou and Wray, 1998). 
 
As private finance has retreated from financing the real economy, the real economy itself 
has also become increasingly financialised, with spending on areas such as share buybacks 
exceeding spending on long-run investments like human capital formation and R&D 
(Lazonick, 2013). Such financialisation of capitalist economies – a process whose 
deleterious effects became evident during the most recent global financial crisis – puts 
reforming the financial system back on the top of the agenda, with the goal of creating a new 
financial system that funds the capital development of the economy. Despite numerous 
attempts and proposals to reform the financial system, the situation remains as before the 
crisis, with speculative finance still rewarded more than patient long-term finance (Kregel, 
2012; Hensarling and McHenry, 2014). 
 
The issue of inept investments is critical if we consider that many countries and regions have 
policy objectives of promoting the smart (innovation-led) growth agenda, framed around 
‘grand challenges’ related to issues such as climate change and the ageing crisis (European 
Commission, 2011). Therefore, the need for long-term investments in the real economy to 
achieve these goals and address the societal challenges is urgent. A key question is where 
will this kind of long-term funding come from, given the trend whereby private finance 
retreats from funding the real economy (Haldane, 2011; Kay, 2012) and the real economy 
itself becomes increasingly financialised (Dore, 2008; Lazonick, 2013)? For instance, Figure 
1 below shows the financialisation of the UK economy by illustrating the degree to which 
financial intermediation has outpaced the growth of the real economy in the UK (with the US 
experiencing a similar process; see discussion in Krippner, 2005)). 
 
Figure 1: The financialisation of the UK economy 
 
Source: Haldane and Alessandri (2010), updated in Mazzucato and Perez (2014).  
 
Hence, if the goal is smart growth, where will the patient finance come from to fund 
innovation cycles that can take 15–20 years? As in the case of previous technological 
revolutions, the answer is: from the state. The state provided most of the high-risk and early 
funding for the IT revolution and for major advances in healthcare, and we are again 
witnessing the active role of public finance in funding the next big thing: green technology 
(Climate Policy Initiative, 2013). Keynes called for a ‘socialization of investments’ as ‘the 
only means of securing an approximation to full employment’ (Keynes, 2006 [1936], p. 246). 
While a kind of countercyclical socialisation of investments is usually recognised and 
associated with Keynes, he actually called for another type of activity in supplement to 
private initiative: ‘The important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are 
doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at 
present are not done at all’ (Keynes, 1927, p. 46). Minsky suggested that one form that this 
Keynesian socialisation of investments should take is of community development banks, 
which were to fill the gap in banking and financial services for small firms and individuals in 
certain local communities (Minsky et al., 1993). One could see the work of SIBs as being 
akin to those of community development banks at the national level. 
 
As discussed in the next section (and supported with empirical data in section 5), SIBs are 
an increasingly important source of strategic public finance. Such institutions represent a 
viable alternative to speculative finance, while also fostering the development of private 
capital markets and financial vehicles for productive projects, thereby helping to reform the 
financial sector from within. In this way, they promote the creation of a more ‘symbiotic’ 
economic ecosystem. SIBs are key sources of patient, long-term committed finance in 
countries like Brazil, China and Germany, among others. 
 
3. The roles of SIBs: from countercyclical and capital development to venture 
capitalist and challenge-led 
 
Mazzucato and Penna (2014) developed a theoretically-informed typology of SIBs. Starting 
with a discussion of market failure theory’s (MFT) rationales and justifications for these roles, 
the authors showed the limitations of this explanation by drawing on concepts and insights 
from heterodox political economy (works in the tradition of Keynes, Schumpeter and 
Minsky). While that paper was mostly conceptual, the present paper will focus on providing a 
rich empirical account of the roles of SIBs (see section 6). Here, we provide a brief 
conceptual description of each role, which is based on the typology fully developed by 
Mazzucato and Penna (2014). 
 
A. The countercyclical role 
 
In the past 50 years, financial markets have exacerbated the swings of business cycles, as 
professional speculators have aimed to obtain short-term gains, even during downturns. The 
type of financial structures in an economy (for example, the types of banks and markets) is 
crucial for the workings of the real economy. While some structures are conducive to what 
Minsky calls ‘capital development’, which includes privately owned capital equipment, 
technologies, skills and public infrastructure (Minsky, 1992), others hamper capital 
development; for example, when speculative finance targets low-risk, short-term gains 
through speculative and Ponzi schemes. From this perspective, the business cycle problem 
is not one of risk aversion and failure to coordinate but is about processes of financialisation 
and speculation. Thus, in playing their countercyclical role, SIBs direct finance to productive 
opportunities throughout the business cycle. In this sense, this role provides the basis for all 
others; it underpins investments in the capital development of the economy, the full 
utilisation of labour resources, the creation of new technologies and sectors, and the 
direction of techno-economic change through mission-oriented investments. 
 
B. Capital development role 
 
Schumpeter (1934 [1912]) argued that economic development is a discontinuous 
endogenous process that results from investments in ‘new combinations’ (innovations). 
From the entrepreneur’s or the corporation’s point of view, the objective of introducing new 
combinations is to create ‘monopoly rents’ (also known as ‘Schumpeterian rents’). 
Interventions and investments that seek to address a market failure aim to bring the 
economy back to the Pareto equilibrium of perfect competition, thereby ‘killing’ 
Schumpeterian rents. Therefore, the justification for SIBs’ capital development role is not to 
be found in MFT but in the works of developmental economists. Recent work on the 
developmental state has shown the importance of active public policies (the ‘visible hand’ of 
the state) for industrialisation and technological change (Reinert 1999; Amsden, 2001; 
Chang, 2002). This literature has also emphasised the importance of networks in fostering 
economic development. In this view, the developmental network state (DNS) can be defined 
as a decentralised network of different types of state agency that foster innovation and 
capital development (see Block and Keller, 2011). This network of agencies comprises 
different actors with various capabilities, which can work together under the coordination of 
the state. SIBs’ capital development role involves supply of capital to, say, public goods 
areas (infrastructure, new knowledge), but these institutions also often work as the lead 
public agency (Mathews, 2006) that coordinates the network of actors in the national system 
of innovation. In order to do this, a SIB may work as an agency to nurture knowledge 
development, invest in infrastructure, promote strategic trade (such as import substitution, 
securing sources of materials) and financial leverage, prioritise investments in existing 
strategic sectors (reinforcing comparative advantages), create ‘national champions’ that are 
able to compete in international markets, and provide coherence to economic policies. As 
we will show in section 5, the developmental role of SIBs underlies (or overlaps with) the 
venture capitalist and mission-oriented roles, because both often promote a particular type 
of capital development. 
 
C. Venture capitalist role 
 
Mazzucato and Penna (2014) conceptualised the venture capitalist role of SIBs by drawing 
on Minsky’s proposal for community development banks, which he saw as a way to promote 
the inclusion and development of individuals, firms and communities that were otherwise 
excluded from the financial system (Minsky et al., 1993). Because the private sector does 
not provide finance for individual entrepreneurs or high-tech start-ups, SIBs have stepped in 
and increasingly provided venture capital. Such actions are related to information 
asymmetries and adverse selection, but also to financial inclusion and financial 
entrepreneurship, which contributes to capital development, broadly defined as including 
labour and natural resources. This kind of action helps to reform the financial sector from 
within, just like Minsky envisaged for community development banks. The challenge in 
playing the VC role is not so much to provide abundant finance to all small ventures or 
entrepreneurs but to find and nurture the so-called ‘gazelles’ (Birch and Medoff, 1994) – that 
is, young, high-tech firms that often happen to be small or medium enterprises – and to 
nurture ‘animal spirits’. This requires social capital (sometimes networking and co-
management) as much as financial capital. The venture capitalist role can also be seen as a 
type of microeconomic industrial policy that complements the macroeconomic capital 
development role by selecting specific firms and projects that have the potential to generate 
Schumpeterian rents and economic development. Another challenge for SIBs acting as 
venture capitalists is how to deal with techno-economic risks and uncertainties when they 
invest in innovation, which is a venture surmounted by fundamental uncertainty (no one 
knows the chances of success). Because innovation takes a long time to develop, and most 
attempts end in failure, patient, long-term, committed finance is required. This is the key 
reason why SIBs have been increasingly mobilised to provide long-term committed venture 
capital for high-tech start-ups. This venture capitalist role often provides a basis for mission-
oriented investments, particularly when SIBs seek to promote radical innovations that 
address societal challenges. 
 
D. Mission-oriented or challenge-led role 
 
In market failure theory, societal challenges are seen as negative externalities: they impose 
a cost to society that is not reflected in prices. However, such a view is limited in its ability to 
explain what SIBs do to address societal challenges. Science and technology policy 
research on mission-oriented initiatives provides an alternative and more complete 
conceptualisation of SIBs’ systemic role because, in performing this role, the SIBs go 
beyond addressing a market failure in order to internalise costs. In this role, SIBs help to 
make things happen that otherwise would not, as Keynes called for the state to do (Keynes, 
1926). More importantly, they pave the way for what Polanyi (2001 [1944]) called a ‘Great 
Transformation’. Polanyi showed that capitalist markets are deeply embedded in social and 
political institutions, rendering the usual static state vs. market juxtaposition meaningless. 
 
Due to their experience and superior position in the economy, SIBs represent a concrete tool 
through which public policy can promote great transformations (see section 3). This occurred 
in the 19th century, when industrial banks – the predecessors of modern SIBS – played a key 
role in providing the finance for the construction of the continental European railway network 
(De Aghion, 1999). This network totally transformed the socio-economic landscape, to the 
point where Perez (2002) called the third technological revolution ‘the age of railroads’. 
 
The new great transformation required to address the large contemporary challenges will not 
arise from market forces, because markets are ‘blind’; that is, incapable of providing a new, 
qualitatively different direction to economic development. A techno-economic system of 
innovation may be locked into a self-reinforcing, path-dependent trajectory, because markets 
are only able to work within the parameters of the prevailing paradigm. Markets are only able 
to influence the rate of change, not the direction of change. This becomes a problem if the 
techno-economic trajectory being followed is inferior or suboptimal to what could be 
achieved with new technologies that are not part of the prevailing system trajectory. In order 
to coordinate techno-economic development towards a new, qualitatively different route, we 
need a paradigm shift that will avoid the constant renewal of prevailing trajectories, which 
occurs if market forces provide directionality to the system. From this perspective, the 
mission-oriented role of SIBs concerns the creation of a new vision that will coordinate 
cognitive efforts of different (public and private) agents and direct their action to areas 
beyond the existing paradigm. 
 
4. The mission-oriented framework and the importance of SIBs in addressing 
societal challenges 
 
The kind of broad-based innovation policy that is often (but not only) driven by ‘security’ 
motives has been referred to as mission-oriented because such policies aim to achieve 
clearly defined technical goals (Ergas, 1987; Freeman, 1996). Rather than just facilitating 
innovation, with the direction being left to markets, such policies include explicit 
technological and sectoral directions. Therefore, public financing of innovation is not always 
a passive reaction to market failures (Arrow, 1962; Peneder, 2008), but an active choice to 
direct funds towards visionary missions (Mazzucato, 2013a). Understanding the role of the 
public sector in innovation within a mission-oriented framework is a different analytical 
exercise to the one derived from the market failure framework (Mazzucato and Penna, 
2014). In its most general form, the mission-oriented framework differentiates between 
public policies that target the development of specific technologies in line with governmental 
goals (‘missions’) and those that aim for the institutional development of a system of 
innovation (Ergas, 1987; Cantner and Pyka, 2001). This framework helps to understand the 
greater breadth of activities that public spending fosters; not only upstream areas like basic 
research (as in a market failure framework), but also applied research and early-stage seed 
financing. 
 
Such mission-oriented investments are featured both in security-led missions (driving 
technologies behind the military and energy complexes) and in such diverse areas as health 
and agriculture (Mowery, 2010; Sampat, 2012; Wright, 2012). Also, the public sector’s 
current active role in tackling renewable energy investments can be seen as a new mission 
related to the green economy. Other new missions include addressing such great societal 
challenges as the ageing/demographic crisis, inequality, and youth unemployment 
(European Commission, 2011). These challenges – persistent issues that occur at the 
system level, comprising environmental, demographic, economic and social problems – 
have entered innovation policy agendas as key justifications for action, providing a direction 
towards which funding policies and innovation efforts should converge. 
 
In countries such as the United States, this kind of mission-oriented funding has come from 
specialist public agencies within executive departments. Examples include DARPA (in the 
Department of Defense), the key funder and developer of the Internet and other information 
and communication technologies; and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the 
Department of Health. In Finland and Israel, mission-oriented funding has taken the form of 
support for technologies and firms, including public venture capital funds, administered 
through Sitra in Finland (an early backer of Nokia) and through the Office of the Chief 
Scientist (OCS) in Israel (which was central in stimulating, seeding and supporting an R&D-
intensive ICT industry) (Breznitz and Ornston, 2013). 
 
In countries like China, Germany and Brazil, active mission-oriented public funding is 
increasingly coming from public banking institutions (Mazzucato and Penna, 2014); 
specifically, SIBs. Indeed, a key number of SIBs across the world have been moving beyond 
their traditional roles of providing counter-cyclical credit and infrastructure funding to also 
provide funding for innovation through venture capitalist and challenge-led roles. However, 
the literature on mission-oriented policies has ignored the potential and actual role that SIBs 
play in promoting and funding new mission-oriented projects. The literature has tended to 
study demand-side innovation policies, such as the role that R&D and military procurement 
has played in the development of radical technologies (Mowery, 2010, 2012; see also 
Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012). The literature has also looked at only a limited 
number of financial (supply-side) tools; namely, non-reimbursable public finance for basic 
research and innovation development, such as grants (Sampat, 2012; Wright, 2012), 
subsidies (including tax credits; see Veugelers, 2012), and innovation prizes (Murray et al., 
2012). Consequently, little attention has been paid to alternative forms of finance such as 
those provided by SIBs. 
 
There are several reasons why it is problematic to ignore the role of SIBs. First, these banks 
are playing a leading role in funding what could be the most important new international 
mission: arresting climate change. Climate change (along with energy security) is the reason 
why the US’s stimulus programme (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
of 2009) was highly green-directed (Grunwald, 2012). Between the announcement of ARRA 
and February 2012, US$22.3 billion was devoted to clean energy projects via the 
Department of Energy (DoE) (DoE, 2012). While this figure may appear impressive, it is only 
a small fraction of what SIBs are contributing worldwide. In 2012 alone, SIBs invested 
US$108.9 billion in clean energy projects (renewable energy, energy efficiency, and smart 
grids) (Louw, 2013). In 2012 the largest funders, KfW from Germany and the China 
Development Bank, spent US$34.4 billion and US$26.0 billion, respectively. Meanwhile, the 
market for green bonds to finance renewable energy projects totalled a mere US$5.1 billion 
(2 per cent of total investments in 2012) (FS-UNEP/BNEF, 2013). Consequently, SIBs were 
the most important investors in green energy in 2012. To understand other reasons why it is 
problematic to overlook the mission-oriented role of SIBs, we must understand the 
differences between the technological missions of the past and the new societal challenges.    
 
In recent years, there has been a call for a return to such policies as a way to address grand 
societal challenges (Mowery et al., 2010). Missions in the past were often related to well-
defined outcomes, such as putting a man on the moon. However, Foray et al. (2012) has 
claimed that modern missions such as addressing the ageing/demographic problem or 
climate change are more complex because there is less of a clear technological objective 
that signals when the mission is accomplished. Contemporary missions aim to address 
broader and persistent challenges that require long-term commitments to the development 
of many technological solutions and ‘a continuing high rate of technical change and a set of 
institutional changes’ (Freeman, 1996, p. 34). The so-called ‘Maastricht Memorandum’ 
(Soete and Arundel, 1993) provides a detailed analysis of the differences between ‘old’ and 
‘new’ mission-oriented projects (Table 1): 
 
‘[O]lder projects developed radically new technologies through government 
procurement projects that were largely isolated from the rest of the economy, 
though they frequently affected the structure of related industries and could 
lead to new spin-off technologies that had wide-spread effects on other 
sectors. In contrast, mission-oriented environmental projects will need to 
combine procurement with many other policies in order to have pervasive 
effects on the entire structure of production and consumption within an 
economy.’ (Soete and Arundel, 1993, p. 50) 
 
Although the memorandum specifically focuses on mission-oriented programmes that tackle 
environmental challenges, its analysis applies to other contemporary challenges (water and 
food supply, energy efficiency and security, diseases, well-being, demographic change, 
etc.). All of the challenges present similar characteristics, particularly the fact that new 
technologies for addressing them will need to substitute for old, incumbent technologies, and 
will therefore require long-term commitments from both public and private agents. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of old and new ‘mission-oriented’ projects 
Old: Defence, nuclear and aerospace New: Environmental technologies 
The mission is defined in terms of the number 
of technical achievements, with little regard to 
their economic feasibility. 
The mission is defined in terms of 
economically feasible technical solutions to 
particular environmental problems. 
The goals and the direction of technological 
development are defined in advance by a small 
group of experts. 
The direction of technical change is 
influenced by a wide range of actors 
including government, private firms and 
consumer groups. 
Centralised control within a government 
administration. 
Decentralised control with a large number 
of involved agents. 
Diffusion of the results outside of the core of 
participants is of minor importance or actively 
discouraged. 
Diffusion of the results is a central goal and 
is actively encouraged. 
Participation is limited to a small group of firms 
due to the emphasis on a small number of 
radical technologies. 
An emphasis on the incrementalist 
development of both radical and 
incremental innovations in order to permit a 
large number of firms to participate. 
Self-contained projects with little need for 
complementary policies and scant attention 
paid to coherence. 
Complementary policies vital for success 
and close attention paid to coherence with 
other goals. 
Source: Soete and Arundel (1993, p. 51). 
 
This characterisation of old and new missions can be used to highlight the importance of the 
type of funding sources for the development of challenge-related innovations. Because old 
missions were defined through a top-down, centralised process, funding sources were 
executive agencies insulated from the rest of society, which defined the scope of policies 
and selected a restricted number of firms to develop radical technologies. As these old 
missions sought to develop radical technologies, regardless of their economic feasibility, 
grants and subsidies (non-reimbursable funding) or public procurement (which guaranteed 
demand for technologies) were used successfully. In the case of new missions 
(environmental and others), it is unlikely that this centralised model will work. There are five 
reasons for this. Firstly, economic feasibility will be as important as technological feasibility 
because the new technologies will have to compete with incumbent ones. Secondly, the new 
missions target technologies for areas in which many stakeholders participate, such as 
energy systems, health systems or the economy at large (as in the case of climate change). 
Thirdly, in new missions, mass diffusion throughout the economy is crucial and needs to 
take place together with technology development. Fourthly, incremental innovation is just as 
important as radical innovation, as in the case of energy efficiency measures that help cut 
carbon emissions. Finally, mission-oriented policies (such as finance for low-carbon 
innovation) must be coordinated with other policies that affect the targeted domain (for 
example, carbon emission standards and targets). 
 
In the present paper, we consider the way in which the increasing role of SIBs in innovation 
is best understood through the mission-oriented framework discussed above. We also 
analyse the more traditional roles of SIBs, showing how old and new roles overlap. Our 
analysis seeks to highlight the role that alternative sources of finance (can) play in mission-
oriented innovation policies, the impact these sources have on the innovation processes, 
and the potential for using them in support of new missions. 
 
Given recent critiques of SIBs, any evaluation must be based on what the SIBs are actually 
trying to achieve. By extending our analysis of their functions to include a Schumpeterian 
mission-oriented rationale, we also suggest that criteria for evaluation should take these 
types of objectives into account. We elaborate on this point in the concluding section of this 
paper. However, not all SIBs are playing mission-oriented roles; in fact, most institutions still 
promote investments that narrowly aim to close market gaps and correct market failures. 
Moreover, many SIBs have been ineffective and inefficient in their interventions, which has 
led to call to reform these institutions by such means as establishing clear mandates and 
improving governance structures (Gutierrez et al., 2011). We will also return to this important 




In section 6, we explore the activities of two state investment banks: the Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW), Germany’s SIB; and the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social (BNDES), Brazil’s SIB. These two banks were chosen because they are 
two of the most active public banks investing in innovation and grand challenges; others 
include the China Development Bank and the European Investment Bank (for a more 
general discussion of those banks, see Mazzucato and Penna, 2014). Furthermore, because 
the KfW is from an industrialised economy and the BNDES is from a developing economy, 
the two banks provide contrasting examples regarding their institutional environments. Our 
objective is to illustrate how these two banks have provided much more than just (macro) 
counter-cyclical lending, or infrastructure investments. They have directed such investments 
into certain ‘smart’ areas, such as green and pharmaceuticals, and have developed tools 
such as public venture capital funds in order to stimulate new firm creation in high-risk areas.  
 
In studying these banks, we adopt an exploratory methodology by use of an open-ended, 
qualitative case study approach. This method is appropriate for ‘[investigating] a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ and, thus, there are ‘many more 
variables of interest than data points’ (Yin, 2003, p. 13). This is the case of the actions 
undertaken by mission-oriented SIBs: they are a contemporary phenomenon, whereby the 
actors (SIBs) cannot be dissociated from their contexts (country-specific institutional setting 
and challenges). The roles performed by SIBs co-evolve with their contexts (for instance, 
global developments, business cycles, other governmental policies, etc.) and are influenced 
by a multitude of macro and micro variables. With this method we seek to address an 
overarching question: How do these banks undertake mission-oriented or challenge-led 
investments? The case study methodology is appropriate for ‘how’ questions (Yin, 2003), 
such as the one we are trying to answer, and is also well suited to explore complex 
phenomena for theory development (George and Bennett, 2005). Our methodology draws 
on prior theories (revised in previous sections) and studies to guide data collection and 
analysis. We draw on data from several primary and secondary sources. In what follows, we 
first compare KfW’s and BNDES’s institutional and contextual settings (section 5.1), then 
present and analyse KfW’s mission-oriented investments across the four roles described in 
section 3 (section 5.2), and those of BNDES (section 5.3).  
 
6. Case study: KfW and BNDES 
 
6.1. Institutional context 
 
It is important to consider each bank’s unique institutional context. Both institutions are very 
active in their respective economies and equally profitable (Table 2), but they differ in certain 
ways (Table 3). Taking 2012 as benchmark year, we see that KfW’s assets and financing 
portfolio are twice as large as BNDES’s, but both display roughly the same level of net 
profits. On the other hand, the weight of BNDES’s investments in its country’s economy is 
much higher than KfW’s: BNDES accounts for 21 per cent of total credit in Brazil vs. 13 per 
cent in the case of KfW in Germany. 
 
Table 2: Performance of KfW and BNDES in 2012 
 Germany’s KfW Brazil’s BNDES 
Assets (US$ Million) 657,347 367,825 
Financing portfolio (US$ 
million) 526,401 254,019 
Credit/total credit 12.7% 21.0% 
Credit/GDP 15.5% 11.3% 
Net profit (US$ million) 3.063 3.009 
Non-performing loans 0.21% 0.06% 
ROA 0.47% 0.90% 
ROE 11.52% 12.50% 
Employees  5190   2853  
Source: Based on Ferraz et al. (2013). 
 
In terms of institutional characteristics, both SIBs have broad mandates and play the four 
roles outlined in section three. However, they do not invest in the exact same areas – KfW 
does not invest in agriculture and BNDES does not provide international aid or credit for 
education. Furthermore, KfW’s regulatory setting is specific, in that it responds directly to the 
country’s minister of finance and minister of economics and technology (since 2013 the 
minister for economic affairs and energy) and it applies and complies with certain selected 
rules from the German Banking Act. In contrast, BNDES, like any public and private bank in 
Brazil, is supervised by the country’s securities and exchange commission (CVM) and by the 
Brazilian federal court of accounts (TCU), which audits BNDES’s operations. 
 
Both institutions practise direct lending and (indirect) on-lending through private banks (also 
known as tier 1 and tier 2 operations). In the case of KfW, direct lending only occurs in case 
of priority areas (namely those served by the revolving funds from the Marshall Plan) and for 
international clients. Finally, the way each institution obtains its own funding differs. KfW’s 
original funding came from the Marshall Plan. Unlike other European countries, whose 
governments simply spent the money, in Germany a bank was created to manage and 
invest the Marshall funds, which allowed them to be revolved and continuously invested to 
this day. KfW has grown in size and scope, to the point that most of its funding is now 
obtained through issuing bonds and selling them in capital markets. Although BNDES’s 
sources of funding have changed considerably over time, since the late 1980s funding has 
mainly come from the compulsory pension fund for workers (the so-called FAT, which is 
mandated through the Brazilian constitution) and revolving funds (return on investments). 
Another part of BNDES’s funding comes from the Brazilian Treasury. This is particularly the 
case since the recent global financial crisis, when the Brazilian government transferred 
funds from the Treasury to BNDES so that it could execute a pronounced counter-cyclical 
role. We shall return to these characteristics in the concluding section 6, when we discuss 
whether the sources of funding matter (and whether other differences in the way a SIB is 
structured matter). 
 
Table 3: Institutional characteristics of KfW and BNDES 
 KfW BNDES 
Year established 1948 1952 
Ownership (state-
owned/private) 100% state-owned 100% state-owned 
Mandate (broad/narrow) Broad Broad 
Agriculture  x 
Capital markets x x 
Education credit x  
Exports x x 
Green economy x x 
Infrastructure x x 
Innovation x x 
International aid x  
Internationalisation x x 
SMEs x x 
Regulatory setting specific same as private sector 
Financing model 
(direct/indirect) 
Direct (priority areas 
and international 
clients) and indirect (all 
others) 
Direct and indirect 
Funding sources Capital markets and revolving funds 
Treasury, workers’ 
pension funds* and 
revolving funds 
Independent board of 
directors? Yes Yes 
Source: Based on Ferraz et al. (2013) and annual reports of the institutions. 
 
6.2. KfW, the German Development Bank 
 
KfW was founded in 1948 with the ‘mission’ of executing and managing the funds for 
reconstruction of the German economy provided by the Marshall Plan (officially called the 
European Recovery Program, or ERP).2 Therefore, KfW initially played a capital 
development role, which in the 1960s was supplemented with new programmes aimed at 
new ventures (SMEs) and innovation. Today KfW plays all four SIB roles, which are 
increasingly intertwined, particularly when guided by the overarching mission of promoting 
Germany’s energy transition, the so-called Energiewende, a plan to shift the country’s 
energy base from nuclear and fossil fuels to renewables. In this case study, we focus on 
how the Energiewende plan provides directionality to KfW’s activities across the four SIB 
roles (counter-cyclical, capital development, venture capitalist, and challenge-led). We also 
focus on how specific programmes are structured and organised, and end with a brief 
discussion of tangible and intangible outcomes from KfW’s activities that aim at 
environmental and climate protection. While we do not provide a detailed evaluation of these 
programmes, in the concluding section 7 we will discuss how an evaluative framework could 
draw on new indicators that are able to capture a SIB’s contribution to particular missions. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 KfW’s programmes that still use revolved funds from the Marshall Plan are identified with the acronym ERP. 
 
The organisation of KfW’s operations has changed throughout the years and the KfW Group 
is currently divided into four functional divisions. Two divisions are responsible for promoting 
investments in the German economy. The Mittelstandsbank (loosely translated as SME 
Bank) invests in small- and medium-sized enterprises, business start-ups and other 
commercial clients (such as entrepreneurs) in Germany. The Kommunal- und 
Privatkundenbank/ Kreditinstitute (Municipal and Private Client Bank/Credit Institute) 
oversees KfW’s housing programmes, energy efficiency and other macro-investments in 
environmental and climate protection, educational finance for private clients in Germany, as 
well as financing for public investments in infrastructure projects, urban modernisation, etc. 
(through, for example, municipalities, regional promotional banks). The other two divisions 
have an international orientation. The KfW IPEX-Bank is the export-import leg of KfW, 
promoting internationalisation of German companies and structuring finance for selected 
projects (including European power plants and grid lines, for instance), while the KfW DEG 
(Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft) is responsible for development aid 
and other investments in developing countries. In 2013, KfW established a foundation, the 
KfW Stiftung, which is responsible for promoting initiatives related to major societal 
challenges and will result in smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 
 
The overall result is an organisational structure that covers three roles that SIBs play in 
capitalist economies: the Mittelstandsbank is responsible for KfW’s venture capital and 
innovation investments; the Kommunal- und Privatkundenbank/Kreditinstitute and the IPEX-
Bank are responsible for KfW’s investments in capital development, infrastructure, other 
public goods, etc.; and the Stiftung is fully concerned with challenge-led initiatives and 
investments. The fourth role – countercyclical – has been executed by the various KfW 
divisions but, since the 2007 global financial crisis, has become an important aspect of the 
Mittelstandsbank’s investments. As we will show below, the Stiftung and all of KfW’s other 
divisions have followed the direction provided by major societal challenges, environment and 
climate protection in particular. Investing in climate and environmental protection and 
contributing to Germany’s Energiewende is so important to the way KfW operates that even 
investments in (highly-efficient) coal-fired power plants are justified as a way to help the 
energy transition to renewable sources, because they allow for relatively large CO2 
reductions at relatively low CO2 abatement costs during a period when the price-
performance of renewable energy is not yet attractive (KfW, 2014a). 
 
Therefore, when KfW announced its countercyclical stimulus package in 2008, it included 
not only liquidity measures (such as provision of working capital) but also measures directed 
to areas that would help address societal challenges. This included increased funding for 
innovation, infrastructure, commercial investments, environmental protection, energy 
efficiency, and demographic rehabilitation (Table 4). In this sense, KfW’s countercyclical 
investments have overlapped in recent years with capital development, venture capital and 
challenge-led (green) investments.  
 
  












• Stepping up existing programmes for energy-
efficient construction and rehabilitation 
• New programme: Senior-friendly conversions 
€8.5 billion 
3. Innovation and 
energy-efficiency of 
enterprises 
• Stepping up existing programmes: 
- ERP Innovation Programme 
- ERP Energy Efficiency Programme 
- ERP Start Fund 
• New programme: 
- KfW Programme Renewable Energies 
(Supplement) 
€1 billion 
4. Infrastructure • New programme: Investment Offensive Infrastructure €3 billion 
Total €52.5 billion 
Source: KfW (2009, p. 43). 
 
The direction of these investments has been provided by the three pre-established missions, 
or key challenges, that guide KfW’s lending and promotional activities (KfW, 2014b): (1) 
climate change and environmental protection, (2) globalisation and technical progress, and 
(3) demographic change. In 2011–2012, more than two-thirds of KfW’s financial 
commitments contributed to at least one of these trends, with climate change and 
environmental protection representing 40 per cent of all commitments of the KfW Group 
(Figure 2). Therefore, the challenge of addressing climate change by reducing carbon 
emissions is the major vector that provides direction to KfW’s investments. 
 
Figure 2: Major challenges (or ‘themes’) that provide direction to KfW’s investments 
 
Source: KfW’s annual reports. 
 
KfW’s history of investing in energy efficiency and environmental protection dates back to 
the 1970s, but it was in the 2000s that KfW activities in the area accelerated. In the past 
decade, Germany has established a climate policy framework (Gumb, 2012) that includes 
such regulatory initiatives as the Renewable Energy Act (2000), which obliges grid operators 
to give priority to renewables; the Integrated Energy and Climate Programme (2007); the 
Climate Initiative (2008); and the Energy Strategy (2010), which established voluntary 
carbon-emission reduction targets (21 per cent by 2012, 40 per cent by 2020, and 80–95 per 
cent by 2050, all relative to 1990). The policy framework culminated in 2011 with the bold 
Energiewende initiative, which set the goal of phasing out nuclear power sources and of 
having renewable energy sources meet 60 per cent of Germany’s gross final energy 
consumption by 2050. On one hand, this policy framework has meant that Germany has 
established strict regulations, such as a tight energy savings ordinance or the mandatory 
use of renewable energy for heating in new buildings. On the other hand, Germany has also 
assigned KfW with the task of targeting loans to projects that promote energy efficiency and 
the development of renewable energy sources. As a result, KfW’s domestic investments in 
environmental and climate protection have increased fivefold since 2000, reaching €22.2 
billion in 2013 (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: KfW’s domestic investments in environmental and climate protection 
 
Source: KfW’s annual reports. 
 
The structure of KfW’s contribution to the Energiewende initiative has been outlined by an 
action plan that is comprised of new challenge-led programmes and of revised promotional 
programmes in the areas of capital development (infrastructure), venture capital (SME 
support), and innovation (Gumb, 2012). In this sense, all of KfW’s divisions were included in 
the Energiewende effort. Renewable energy programmes and innovation investments are 
executed by the Mittelstandsbank, investments in energy efficiency (in housing and public 
buildings) and urban infrastructure are carried out by the Kommunalbank, while the IPEX-
Bank promotes project finance for large investments in power plans and energy grids. 
 
In addition to its investment programmes, the Mittelstandsbank also performs a networking, 
advisory and brokerage role. KfW’s mandate establishes that KfW shall provide ‘advisory 
services and the implementation of promotional measures in the field of technical progress 
and innovations’ for the promotional areas of (a) SMEs, liberal professionals and start-ups 
and (b) risk capital. In practice, this means that KfW performs a coordinating role in the 
German system of innovation. This is particularly visible in the scope of Germany’s ‘Energy 
Turnaround’ initiative, in which KfW engages in non-financial activities, such as lobbying, 
networking, information and consulting (Gumb, 2012). These service-side measures also 
include training of external consultants in energy efficiency. Such training is a pre-requisite 
for being listed in KfW’s energy efficiency expert database, a network of experienced 
consultants (engineers and scientists with experience in energy consultancy) that is 
available for firms that may be willing to invest in energy efficiency but do not know how to 
proceed. Accordingly, the main goal of providing this expert knowhow is to stimulate firms 
and other clients to invest in energy efficiency measures. To further incentivise firms to 
contract expert consultancy services and invest in energy efficiency, KfW also began to 
provide grants for qualified and independent energy efficiency advice. 
 
Figure 4 (a, b) displays the disbursements by the Mittelstandsbank since 2000, organised 
into broad categories. The figure shows that investments by KfW’s SME and VC division has 
substantively increased, reaching € 22.6 billion in 2013, and that investments in 
environmental and climate protection have taken an increasing share of the 
Mittelstandsbank’s disbursements, particularly after 2011 when it reached almost 50 per 
cent. Figure 7a also shows that between 2009 and 2011, KfW Mittelstandsbank fulfilled a 
countercyclical role, which accounted for 30 per cent of its investments in 2009, 22 per cent 
in 2010, and 3 per cent in 2011, when the Special Programme was phased out. From 2008 
to 2013, the bulk of Mittelstandsbank’s green investments were accounted for by the 
renewable energies programme, which totalled €37.6 billion (or 66 per cent of €56.9 in green 
investments), followed by environmental protection and energy efficiency programmes 
(€17.9 billion or 31 per cent). Investments through the offshore wind programme totalled 
€736 million (since 2011) and through the Energiewende Financing Initiative, €243 million (in 
2012 and 2013). 
 
Figure 4 (a, b): KfW Mittelstandsbank’s investments since 2000 
 
 
Source: KfW’s annual reports. 
 
Figure 5, which displays the investments by KfW’s Kommunal- und Privatkundenbank/ 
Kreditinstitute in 2012 and 2013, shows that the green directionality is also present in KfW’s 
infrastructural investments. The Kommunalsbak’s energy efficiency programmes offer 
interest-subsidised long-term loans (10 years) of up to €50,000 per housing unit (new 
buildings) and €75,000 for existing buildings being rehabilitated; these programmes also 
include partial debt relief of up to 12.5 per cent. To further incentivise energy efficiency 
infrastructural investments, KfW developed its own energy efficiency certificate (KfW-
Efficienzhaus/KfW-Efficiency House), which became a symbol for the energy efficiency of 
buildings (Gumb, 2012). 
 
  
Figure 5: Investments by KfW’s Kommunal- und Privatkundenbank in 2012 and 2013 
 
Source: KfW (2014). 
 
Finally, we highlight two examples of project finance structured by KfW IPEX-Bank. The first 
is the 400MW offshore wind farm Global Tech I, a flagship offshore energy demonstration 
project in Germany that was the largest example of offshore wind financing in the world 
(€1.05 billion) and involved high technological risks (due to the distance to the shore and the 
water depth) (Enting, 2013). KfW alone committed one-third of this funding (another investor 
in the pool of 17 banks was the EIB). A similar project finance structured by KfW (the first 
offshore wind farm financed through PE and coordinated by KfW) was the 288 MW offshore 
wind farm Meerwind, in which KfW IPEX-Bank was the largest commercial lender (€195 
million) (Enting, 2013). 
 
Therefore, what we see in KfW is a preference for promotional loans with subsidised credit, 
which is offered through specific programmes that target particular projects that help 
address societal challenges. Such programmes are executed by KfW’s divisions and 
subsidiaries. In addition to promotional loans, KfW also uses equity, particularly for capital 
intensive and risky projects in such technically uncertain areas as offshore wind. KfW also 
adopts equity when investing in small technology-based firms and other venture capital 
investments, but we could not identify whether they target firms that contribute to the societal 
challenges (for example, new start-ups developing breakthrough energy technologies). As 
the next subsection shows, such a structure is quite different from that of BNDES, which 
developed an explicit toolbox for funding mission-oriented innovations. 
 
The results of KfW’s recent long-term investments are yet to be seen (and will need to be 
independently evaluated). However, it is possible to highlight some existing outcomes 
reported by KfW. Regarding its recent countercyclical investments, KfW estimates that over 
its three years of existence the Special Programme accounted for the creation or 
maintenance of 750,000 job posts. Other KfW anti-cyclical investments under Germany’s 
stimulus packages secured a further 450,000 jobs. An external evaluation (reported in Duve, 
2007) has estimated that KfW’s building rehabilitation investments in 2006 (through the 
Kommunalbank) created 65,000 jobs and allowed for greenhouse gas emissions to be 
reduced by 700,000 tons of CO2 equivalents per year, while energy demand was reduced by 
40 per cent. KfW also reports that its energy-efficient construction and refurbishment 
programmes led to emission cuts of more than one million tons of CO2 equivalents per year 
in 2009 and 2011, and about 600,000 tons in 2011, while securing on average 268,000 job 
positions per year (KfW, 2013, p. 6). The same KfW report estimates that KfW renewable 
energies programmes (in Germany, excluding KfW IPEX-Bank’s project finance) created an 
average of 50,000 jobs per year in 2009–2011 and helped cut greenhouse gas emissions by 
3.7 million tons in 2009, 4.8 million tons in 2010, and 5.1 million tons in 2011, thereby 
avoiding more than €1 billion in costs associated with fossil fuel imports (KfW, 2012, p. 6). 
Furthermore, KfW’s renewable energies programmes in Germany helped to mobilise private 
investments, with private investors committing one extra euro for every three euros invested 
by KfW. 
 
6.3. BNDES, the Brazilian Development Bank 
 
BNDES was founded in 1952 to finance the construction of key infrastructural projects, the 
building of basic industries, and the mechanisation of agriculture; in other words, to fund 
Brazil’s catch-up strategies. In the 1960s and 1970s, BNDES focused on promoting import 
substitution industrial policies, thereby furthering the capital development role. In the 1980s, 
it began to develop financial instruments for new ventures and SMEs and in the 1990s it 
experimented with specific programmes to finance innovation and high-tech firms. In the last 
decade, BNDES has enlarged its operational scope with mission-oriented innovation 
investments. Targeted sectoral programmes such as Prosoft (which targets innovation in the 
software industry) and Profarma (which targets pharmaceutical innovation) were 
established. Our analysis of BNDES’s challenge-oriented investments focuses on how they 
contribute to Brazil’s mission of promoting ‘smart’ (innovation-led) growth.3 As with the KfW 
study, we will attempt to pay particular attention to aspects of directionality and structural 
organisation of BNDES’s investments.4 
 
As the Brazilian Federal government shifts its impetus towards industrial policy, one of its 
defined missions has been to address the challenge of increasing expenditures in R&D and 
innovation. The mission has targeted specific, capital-intensive manufacturing sectors and, 
in doing so, has enlisted BNDES as the largest funding agency, which cooperates with other 
public agencies such as FINEP (Brazil’s innovation finance agency). Like KfW, BNDES has 
defined three themes to guide its investments. These are three interrelated issues that 
represent ‘the new challenges to be tackled: innovation [smart growth], socio-environmental 
development [environmentally sustainable growth], as well as local and regional 
development, prioritising the less developed regions [inclusive growth] in Brazil’.5 
 
BNDES’s organisational structure is more complex than that of KfW, with eight managing 
areas that are responsible for a total of 22 operational divisions (there is also a 23rd division, 
which is responsible for the internal auditing). The so-called BNDES System also includes 
three subsidiaries that complement BNDES’s main structure. The first is FINAME (the 
Special Agency for Industrial Financing), which is BNDES’s export-import arm and was 
previously a fund for managing earmarked public resources for financing purchase, sales !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Entering a new phase of economic development will require Brazil to become a ‘maker’ of technologies and 
innovations (Schapiro, 2012). This involves augmenting national investments in R&D and also establishing an 
‘innovation culture’ amongst Brazilian firms (Cavalcante and de Negri, 2011; Negri et al., 2005). 
4 The authors are grateful to Valéria Bastos, an economist at BNDES, who shared not only the data on BNDES 
disbursements for innovation in the 2000–2010 period (Bastos, 2012), but also her knowledge about BNDES’s 
innovation financing activities. We are also grateful to João Pieroni, manager at BNDES’s pharmaceutical 
department, for articles, data and information provided during several email exchanges between March and May, 
2013. An unstructured interview with Mr Pieroni was also carried out on March 11th, 2013. 
5 Source: http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/Institucional/The_BNDES/mission.html; 
accessed on 4/9/2013. 
operations and exports of Brazilian machinery and equipment, as well as imports of goods of 
the same nature. The second is BNDESPar, which is responsible for capitalisation 
operations and equity investments in the Brazilian capital market. The third subsidiary is 
BNDES Plc., headquartered in London, which promotes the internationalisation of Brazilian 
companies and seeks to attract international investors to fund BNDES-led investment 
projects in Brazil. The matching between BNDES’s managing areas and operational 
divisions with the four SIB roles is less straightforward than KfW’s organisational structure. 
Some managing areas (for example, those that include human resources or the legal 
division) are concerned with and provide support to all roles. Others, such as those devoted 
to agriculture or infrastructure, are more specialised and could be seen as performing the 
capital development role. Yet others are engaged in more than one role, such as the 
managing area devoted to venture capital, capital markets, and industrialisation. 
 
The overlapping of areas/divisions and roles in BNDES is less obvious than in KfW. 
Therefore, it is not easy to identify how societal challenges give direction to investments 
carried out by each managing area and division. Instead, it is possible to look at how 
BNDES developed specific, targeted programmes that contribute to the fulfilment of the 
smart growth mission. These programmes are closely related to the industrial policy plans 
established by the Brazilian Federal government since 2003, when it established the Trade, 
Technology and Industrial Policy plan (PITCE). In the period prior to 2011, the Brazilian 
government established two other plans, each of which gave increasing emphasis to 
innovation and strategic sectors. The latest plan, Plano Brasil Maior (‘Greater Brazil Plan’ – 
PBM), which is due to last until 2014, prioritised the following six strategic sectors: IT, the 
pharmaceutics and health industry, oil and gas, the defence industrial complex, aerospace, 
and renewables. 
 
Support for innovation became a strategic priority at BNDES following the 2003 industrial 
policy plan (PITCE). Innovation was converted into the key variable in BNDES’s Operational 
Policy document, which stated that innovation support ‘will [henceforth] also be considered 
of maximum priority by BNDES’ (cited in Schapiro, 2012, p. 24). New tools and programmes 
were then designed to support innovation. Although the inclusion of innovation as a core 
principle only came in the 2000s, BNDES began its financial support for innovation in the 
1990s. Figure 6 presents a timeline of initiatives and experiments with financing innovation 
that the Brazilian development bank has undertaken. The trajectory is closely linked to the 
recent sectoral approach of industrial policy plans in Brazil. 
 
  
Figure 6: Timeline of the introduction of different tools for funding for innovation 
 
Source: Based on Chart 3 in Schapiro (2012), with additions based on Bastos (2012). 
 
In the 1990s, BNDES adopted a proactive approach to funding innovation when it 
established its first targeted funding for innovation, which focused on companies in the 
software sector (Bastos, 2012). The so-called Prosoft was the Bank’s first vertical line of 
credit (a targeted fixed income tool) that provided flexible and generous conditions for 
innovators. The Prosoft experience was copied in the form of a new programme for the 
pharmaceutical sector, Profarma. In this way, BNDES started to fund smart growth 
embedded in its promotion of industrialisation, and this smart-growth began to give a 
direction to BNDES’s capital development and VC initiatives. Subsequently, BNDES 
established FUNTEC, a non-refundable category of finance for technology and innovation, 
funded with part of the bank’s own profits (Bastos, 2012), which targets strategic sectors.6 It 
also created new sectoral programmes and extended its funding programme to pre-start-up 
companies (Schapiro, 2012) with the creation of the CRIATEC investment fund (which 
receives 80 per cent of its resources from BNDES). CRIATEC provides seed capital to start-
ups, mainly from the ICT and biotechnology sectors (Cherobim et al., 2011). The result of 
this two-decade-long process was the establishment of legal, managerial and institutional 
capacity inside BNDES, with a set of different types of funding for innovation under four 
categories (variable and fixed income; variable income; fixed income; and non-refundable 




6 The list of sectors is constantly being reviewed, but currently includes energy, environment, pharma, 






















Figure 7: The toolbox of funding for innovation from BNDES 
 
Source: Based on Fig. 1 in Coutinho et al. (2011), with additions based on Bastos (2012) 
and Schapiro (2012). 
 
Apart from the sectoral focus that some programmes have (each involving different levels of 
uncertainty and of capital intensity), BNDES’s tools and programmes focus on different 
areas of the risk landscape. As shown in Figure 8, BNDES toolbox of innovation funding 
covers all stages in the life-cycle of an innovative enterprise. 
 
Figure 8: BNDES’s types of funding for innovation for the different stages of the innovative 
enterprise 
 
Source: Authors’ construction 
 
The toolbox for the support of innovation presents certain characteristics that meet the 
specificities of an innovation project or innovative firm: 
 
• Collateral and repayment obligations decrease with the increased risk/uncertainty of 
the project or targeted area. The extreme case seems to be FUNTEC, whereby 
BNDES fulfils the role of an angel investor, without any financial obligation to the 
receivers.7 However, the receivers are required to fulfil their technological mission 
and to clearly establish an intellectual property sharing agreement. FUNTEC targets 
those areas with future potential, which can result in commercial technologies that 
represent a radical departure from incumbent sectors. These areas are energy, 
environment (green-tech), electronics, new materials, chemistry, and electric 
vehicles. In the case of small innovative firms in their incubation, start-up or 
launching stages, BNDES adopts innovation funding based on equity investments, 
and funding requests are evaluated in the light of potential future results. This 
requires BNDES to employ not only finance specialists but also experts in each 
sector in which it invests. For innovative projects (as opposed to innovative firms), 
BNDES uses risk contracts in which it agrees to fund 90 per cent of the project and 
shares in future sales of the innovative product, if successful (BNDES, 2012).8 
• The younger the innovating firm, the more involvement BNDES has in its 
management.9 During the incubation, start-up and launching stages, BNDES acts as 
a venture capitalist, supplying not only seed capital but actively engaging in the 
management and governance of the firm. Although BNDES does not hold majority 
stakes in these young companies, the standard stockholder agreement of this mode 
of funding grants BNDES participation in the firm’s board of directors and direct 
access to corporate information (Cherobim et al., 2011; Schapiro, 2012). In this way, 
BNDES not only acts as a financier but is also directly involved in the implementation 
and revisions of the firms’ business plan until its IPO, which, according to Shapiro 
(2012) is BNDES’s preferred withdrawal option: ‘Firstly because it guarantees the 
return of its investment in market conditions, and secondly, because indirectly, it 
favours the development of the Brazilian capital market, which in turn expands its 
investment capacity in new innovative companies due to the broader horizon of 
disinvestment in the future’ (p. 32). These firms are usually required to offer their 
shares in the Brazilian New Market, a new listing segment with higher protection for 
minority shareholders (BNDES, 2012). 
• Innovative projects of non-public or established companies are supported with fixed-
income financial contracts with flexible conditions. BNDES approached the issue of 
financing innovation by making three main assumptions: (a) that innovative projects 
are inherently uncertain; (b) that some established firms seeking funds for innovation 
have no track record (particularly in light of the absence of an innovation culture in 
the Brazilian business sector); and (c) that these companies do not always have 
collateral to offer (Schapiro, 2012). Therefore, evaluation of these projects is based 
on their future prospects (BNDES, 2012) and not on the company’s credit score, 
which requires expert know-how on the part of BNDES. In this way, BNDES is 
actively creating new market and technological opportunities, expanding the 
innovation landscape for the private sector to exploit. Due to the level of uncertainty 
involved, the allocation of resources is gradual and involves close and ongoing 
monitoring of the innovative project (Schapiro, 2012, p. 28). This informal structure 
means that the non-fulfilment of contractual obligations does not necessarily 
constitute contractual default. 
 
Figure 9 shows BNDES’s innovation disbursements by programme. The figure reveals that, 
in 2010, the largest amount of funds went to the Prosoft programme (38 per cent), followed 
by variable-income (VC) funds (20 per cent) and the Innovative Capital horizontal line of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Note that receivers are scientific and technology institutions in partnership with business enterprises. 
8 However, the use of this type of contract is still incipient at BNDES (interview by email with Felipe Marques, 
from BNDES economic research department, on 30/8/2013). 
9 In cases where BNDES buys quotas in private VC funds, co-management is fulfilled by the fund. 
credit (17 per cent). The aggregate figure of innovation investments in the 2000s reveals that 
the majority of funds (51.2 per cent) went to strategic sectors (Prosoft, Profarma and 
FUNTEC), with BNDESPAR and variable-income funds investing a further 31 per cent of the 
total, with the remainder (17.8 per cent) being applied through fixed-income contracts. These 
statistics indicate how BNDES is actively picking strategic sectors with its innovation 
programmes. This is also visible in Figure 10, which shows BNDES’s investments in the 
green economy and for environmental and climate protection since 2000.  
 
Figure 9: BNDES’s total disbursements for innovation programme and tools 
 
Source: Bastos (2012). 
 
  
Figure 10: BNDES’s green investments 
 
Source: Data obtained from BNDES (emails dated 8 and 9 October 2014). 
 
The bulk of BNDES’s ‘green’ investments go towards renewable energy projects (the figure 
excludes investments in large hydroelectricity power plants). Because sustainability is very 
important for BNDES, it has a managing area (division) that is responsible for such 
investments. At BNDES, the green economy is broadly defined to include projects in 
renewable energy (biofuel, solar and wind energy), energy efficiency (in firms), sustainable 
transport (cargo and public, such as diffusion of electric and hybrid vehicles), and water, 
forest and waste management (including grants to local communities that protect their 
natural resources).  
 
To further discuss the outcomes of BNDES’ mission-oriented innovation investments, we will 
focus on three specific programmes or types of investments: BNDESPar’s equity 
investments in high-tech firms (gazelles); CRIATEC’s seed investments; and Profarma 
Innovation, BNDES’ programme that targets pharmaceutical innovation. 
 
• According to data published in Mattos (2008), BNDESPAR held direct investments in 
about three dozen small and mid-sized innovative companies; one-third of the amount 
was invested in ICT and electronics companies and 15 per cent in biotech or biopharma 
companies. The data also shows that BNDES has invested in nanotech, defence, and 
medical equipment companies, among others. These companies offer prospects of very 
high returns due to the inherent risks involved. Examples of successful seed capital 
investments by BNDES (that is, investments from which BNDESPAR managed to exit 
through an IPO10) include the software companies Totvs (IPO in 2006) and Bematech 
(IPO in 2007), the oil industry high-tech supplier Lupatech (IPO in 2006), and the 
fertiliser producer Nutriplant (IPO in 2008). ‘The return of BNDESPAR investments in 
venture and seed capital was about 536% from 2005 to 2007, or 85% per year, which 
reveals solid investment strategies and a laudable selection of investment managers’ 
(Mattos, 2008, p. 23). Thus, BNDES’s equity investment strategy in support of innovative !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Success may be defined in other terms, and IPOs are not always the best criterion (cf. Lazonick and Tulum, 
2011). However, we have drawn on this definition of success as it is also one adopted by BNDES. 
enterprises has established a strong link between risk-sharing and reward-sharing, 
helping to promote a type of risk–reward nexus that is conducive to the capital 
development of the Brazilian economy. In this way, these investments contribute to 
BNDES’s profits, which translate into dividends to the Brazilian Treasury and returns to 
Brazilian workers’ social security funds (FAT). 
• Since 2008, an important portion of BNDES’ equity investments have taken place 
through the CRIATEC investment fund, which supplies seed capital for innovative start-
up companies that develop disruptive technologies in high-tech and new sectors. In 
contrast to ‘old’ mission-oriented public R&D grants that are non-reimbursable (‘not-for-
profit’), CRIATEC ‘aims to achieve capital gains through long-term investment in early-
stage companies (including ‘zero stage’) that have an innovative profile and [offer] high-
return prospects.’11 In its four years of existence, the value of the CRIATEC portfolio has 
grown at a rate of 50 per cent per annum,12 with a compound annual growth rate (CARG) 
per vintage of investments varying between 45 per cent and 160 per cent (Ramundo, 
2013). However, these results are yet to materialise, as BNDES has not yet ‘exited’ from 
the investments in these companies (none has yet carried an IPO); the deadline for this 
to occur is 2017. While some investments may fail, others offer prospects of huge 
returns to BNDES and the other private investors. An exemplary company – which 
presents high potential for large returns – is Bug Agentes Biológicos S.A., which 
develops insects that substitute for pesticides in the control of agricultural plagues and 
has been voted the most innovative company in Brazil and 33rd in the world (Zanatta, 
2012). 
• Profarma has gone through two complete rounds or ‘stages’ (2004–2007 and 2007–
2012). The second phase of the Profarma gave stronger emphasis to the Innovation sub-
programme, with the portfolio of innovation investments increasing from BRL 102 million 
(c. US$57 million) in the first stage to BRL 424 million (c. US$227 million) in the second 
stage (as of December 2011). Consequently, the share of the Innovation sub-programme 
in the entire Profarma portfolio increased from 12 per cent in the first stage to 56 per cent 
in the second (Palmeira Filho et al., 2012). A third stage has been announced in April 
2013 (to last until 2017), which will expand Profarma’s scope to include a new sub-
programme, the ‘Profarma Biotechnology’ (the guidelines of which are still being 
structured).13 This signifies a new emphasis on the development of radical, disruptive 
(biotech) innovations, which are naturally riskier and more uncertain than incremental 
innovations (such as production of generic drugs or new formulations of an existing 
drug). Indicators14 show that the first stage of the Profarma (2003–2007) resulted in 
increased innovation activities by the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector. Data from several 
PINTECs (the Brazilian business R&D and innovation surveys) show that pharmaceutical 
companies’ total R&D investments relative to revenues increased from 3.4 per cent in 
2003 to 4.2 per cent in 2005 and to 4.9 per cent in 2008. In-house R&D investments to 
revenues almost tripled, from 0.5 per cent to 0.7 per cent to 1.4 per cent, respectively, 
while the number of employees in R&D activities almost doubled (from 913 in 2003 to 
1761 in 2008). Considering the size of the Profarma Innovation portfolio and total R&D 
investments by pharmaceutical firms, BNDES was responsible for funding 48.6 per cent 
of total R&D activities and 12.1 per cent of in-house activities. One criticism of 
Profarma’s investments in innovation is that most of the projects it funded consisted of 
‘me-too’ drugs (new formulations or presentations of existing drugs) and of generic 
drugs, with 5.7 per cent of the projects representing global innovations (Palmeira Filho et 
al., 2012). However, all types of projects potentially help foster an innovation culture and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See http://www.fundocriatec.com.br/, accessed on 12/6/2013. 
12 See http://www.fundocriatec.com.br/capital.php?escolha=54, accessed on 12/6/2013. 
13 In April 2013, BNDES also announced the creation of a new programme of funding of medical equipment, a 
joint programme with FINEP aimed at funding the development of medical equipment and of diagnostics 
processes to be used in the Brazilian national health system (so-called SUS). Thus, BNDES is moving beyond 
funding drug developments and towards a broad range of innovation in the health industrial complex. 
14 Data in this paragraph is based on Palmeira Filho et al. (2012). 
improve access of the Brazilian population to medicaments. As we argued in the 
introduction, new missions require investments in both radical and incremental 
innovations. 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Our case study and analysis showed how KfW and BNDES play the Schumpeterian 
‘mission-oriented’ role. As argued in Mazzucato and Penna (2014), these kind of mission-
oriented investments cannot be explained by the market failure approach because such 
investments are creating markets (and technologies, firms and sectors), not just fixing them. 
However, the mission-oriented literature has not yet looked at these public banks. The 
present paper can be viewed as a call for the Schumpeterian tradition to be applied to public 
finance. Governments establish mission-oriented programmes in targeted areas not 
because there is a market in those areas that is not working correctly, but because the areas 
do not exist at all (and, therefore, ‘markets’ do not exist there). Mission-oriented projects are 
about creating new technological landscapes and innovative solutions to fulfil the 
governmental mission.  
 
The fact that it is SIBs that are currently making key investments in new technologies and 
sectors suggests that SIBs are playing a ‘dynamising’ role. Analyses of the performance of 
such banks must take into consideration the different level of risk – beyond economic and 
financial risk measures – that is being absorbed. Furthermore, for such risk taking to be 
enabled, it is essential for these organisations to develop internally without fear of failure, 
which is an inevitable part of the innovation process (Mazzucato and Penna, 2015). An 
important and open question, which we did not seek to address in this paper, might be 
whether the appetite for risk is affected by the source of funds. For example, whether the 
funds come directly from the treasury (as in BNDES’s most recent history), from bond 
issuing on capital markets (as in KfW), from savers’ deposits (as in the case of other SIBs 
such as Italy’s public bank Cassa Depositi and Prestiti) or from workers’ contributions (as in 
the case of BNDES’s FAT fund). 
 
Not all SIBs play a mission-oriented role, or are equally efficient and effective at performing 
it. Some authors (such as Gutierrez et al., 2011; Schapiro, 2012) have argued that the 
establishment of a well-defined mandate is key for the effectiveness of a SIB. For Gutierrez 
et al. (2011), a clearly defined mandate is one that assigns to SIBs a ‘gap filling’ (p. 12) role, 
such as closing the funding gap for SMEs; in other words, a mandate justified by a market 
failure. While we agree that a mandate is crucial, we strongly disagree that it must be guided 
by the market failure approach. Our argument is that these mandates need to target not a 
market failure but a societal challenge; they should be mission-oriented mandates, as is 
becoming the case with KfW and BNDES. Given the broad array of societal challenges 
faced by capitalist economies – ageing, climate change, energy security, obesity, etc. – 
mission-oriented SIBs can make a substantive contribution in the form of catalysing 
investments and dynamising areas for which markets do not yet exist. 
 
We conclude this paper with the following proposition: The very institutional macro-micro 
structure of SIBs makes them the most appropriate type of public agency to tackle grand 
challenges. These challenges are also known as contemporary missions, which have the 
characteristics outlined in the ‘Maastricht Memorandum’ (see Table 1). In light of these 
characteristics, central funding sources (executive agencies), as for the historical missions, 
seem ill-positioned to promote mission-oriented investments. This creates the need for 
alternative sources, and we argue that SIBs, which are already fulfilling a mission-oriented 
role, are appropriate in this regard. As our empirical discussion has shown, the fact that 
these SIBs are banking institutions enables them to access the economic feasibility of 
projects. Moreover, SIBs have traditionally supplied long-term finance (for capital-intensive 
projects, for example), and patient long-term committed finance is crucial for making new 
mission-oriented (or ‘challenge-led’) projects economically feasible. Banking institutions are 
also well positioned to coordinate stakeholders (as is done by KfW’s brokerage and 
networking actions), as part of the banking process is to establish relationships and build up 
a network with an array of actors (from government officials to corporate actors to 
consumers). The vast portfolio of funding tools that SIBs have at their disposal (equity, 
loans, grants, etc.) enables them to match the most appropriate finance to the project (as we 
have shown in the case of BNDES), whether it is incremental or radical (for example, equity 
or risk contracts for the radical innovation, loans to incremental innovation projects, grants to 
visionary R&D). Finally, SIBs have traditionally executed their roles in coordination with 
governmental policies, and new missions could potentially build on this important node in the 
governmental network. We conclude that state investment banks represent a concrete 
institutional tool to help reform the financial system from within.  
 
By placing SIBs at the centre of the investment process, countries like Germany (and to a 
lesser extent – until recently – Brazil) have been able to smooth the effect of speculative 
financial markets and economic crises, at the same time as contributing to a transition to a 
more sustainable, smart and inclusive type of economic development. The research agenda 
on the roles of SIBs require the development of alternative frameworks to the one based on 
market failure theory. This paper has not provided a full answer regarding how alternative 
frameworks to evaluate what SIBs are doing should look (see Mazzucato, 2014; Mazzucato 
and Penna, 2014). The development of a new evaluation framework should include an array 
of new indicators that may capture the dynamic outcomes of mission-oriented investments. If 
strategic SIBs are creating new technologies, firms, sectors and markets, this must translate 
into new indicators to evaluate their performance, judging them on whether markets that did 
not previously exist have been created. Therefore, the new mission-oriented role for SIBs 
calls for new indicators that help show whether these institutions are making things happen 
that otherwise would not. From what we saw in the empirical section, such indicators would 
include: (a) the proportion of investments made in traditional areas (infrastructure) and in 
new (innovation) areas (new technologies, new firms, new sectors); (b) sources of the 
funding used for investments in innovation; (c) the degree of risk incurred in specific areas 
(specifically, areas that are more capital-intensive and embody more technological and 
market risk); (d) the percentage of profits/returns from funding of traditional sectors that are 
reinvested in areas with future potential; (e) indicators of performance from investments in 
innovation and innovative enterprises (for example, new products, technologies, patents, 
high-skilled jobs generated); (f) types of innovation generated (incremental/radical, 
product/process, etc.); and (g) indicators of whether new capabilities and skills are created 
at the firm level, and of whether new technologies, sectors and markets are created at the 
micro- and macro-economic levels. We hope that this paper will stimulate future research 
into the relationship among finance, innovation, and mission-oriented policies, and ultimately 
result in the development of a new framework that can guide mission-oriented policy 
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